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The Marginal Excess Burden of Different Capital Tax Instruments
AB STRACT
Marginal excess burden, defined as the change in deadweight loss for an
additional dollar of tax revenue, has been measured for labor taxes, output
taxes, and capital taxes generally. This paper points out that there is no
well—defined way to raise capital taxes in general, because the taxation of
income from capital depends on many different policy instrumentsincluding the
statutory corporate income tax rate, the investment tax credit rate,
depreciation lifetimes, declining balance rates for depreciation allowances,
and personal tax rates on noncorporate income, interest receipts,dividends,
and capital gains. Marginal excess burden is measured for each of these
different capital tax instruments, using a general equilibrium model that
encompasses distortions in the allocation of real resources over time, among
industries, between the corporate and noncorporate sectors, andamong diverse
types of equipment, structures, inventories, and land.
Although numerical results are sensitive to specifications for key
substitution elasticity parameters, important qualitative resultsare not. We
find that an increase in the corporate rate has the highestmarginal excess
burden, because it distorts intersectoral and interasset decisions as wellas
intertemporal decisions. At the other extreme, an investment tax credit
reduction has negative marginal excess burden because it raisesrevenue while
reducing interasset distortions more than it Increases intertemporal
distortions. In general, we find that marginal excess burdens of different
capital tax instruments vary significantly. They can be more or less than the
marginal excess burden of the payroll tax or the progressive personal income
tax.
Don Fullerton Yolanda K. Henderson
Department of Economics Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
University of Virginia Boston, MA 02106
Charlottesville, VA 22901 (617) 973—3809
(804) 924—7581A substantial literature since Arnold Harberger (1962, 1966) has been
devoted to measuring the total excess burden of different major tax
instruments.1 Economic policy, however, rarely contemplates the wholesale
replacement of entire tax systems. For this reason, a more recent literature
has emphasized measures of "marginal excess burden," the increment to total
welfare cost associated with one dollar of additional revenue from each tax
source.2 The concept and measurement of marginal excess burden are
important in two respects. First, the marginal benefits of a properly
designed public project should cover all social costs, including the marginal
dollar expenditure plus the marginal excess burden.3 Second, for a fixed
level of expenditures, the overall efficiency of the tax system can be
improved by relying less on taxes with high marginal excess burden and more on
taxes with low marginal excess burden. The present paper contributes by
providing new measures of marginal excess burden for a variety of capital tax
instruments in the U.S. and by comparing them to the marginal excess burdens
for other categories of taxation. He find substantial variation in the
results for different components of capital taxation, including some examples
of marginal excess benefit rather than burden.
I. Introduction
-
Browning(1976) originally estimated that the addition to excess burden
from taxes on labor income ranged from 9 to 16 cents per marginal dollar of
revenue. Stuart (1984) employs a fairly simple general equilibrium model to
find that excess burden from labor taxes centers around 21 cents per marginal
dollar of revenue. Other assumptions generate estimates as low as 7 cents or
as high as 99 cents. Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (BSW, 1985) employ a more
complex model that allows them to compare taxes on labor, consumption, and—2—
capital income. Overall marginal excess burden centers around 33 cents per
dollar of revenue but varies between 17 and 56 cents, depending on
assumptions. For most of their combinations of labor supply and savings
elasticities, they find tIat capital taxes are more distorting than
proportional labor taxes. Output taxes and progressive income taxes are in
between. For Sweden's 70 percent aggregate marginal tax rate, Hansson and
Stuart (1985) find excess burdens centering around $1.29 per marginal dollar
of revenue. Finally, Judd (1987) uses a stylized model with perfect foresight
and infinitely lived individuals to find that a dollar raised by a permanent
(a) tax on capital usually costs at least an extra 25 cents, (b) tax on labor
usually costs less than 15 cents, and (C)reductionin the investment tax
credit generally costs more than a dollar.
None of these studies considers specific ways to raise taxes on income
from capital. The BSH model takes average effective tax rates, measured by
capital taxes paid as a fraction of capital income for each industry, and
assumes that these rates also apply to marginal investment. Yet the future
taxes on a marginal investment may differ significantly from the observed
taxes on existing investment. They then calculate marginal excess burden from
increasing all industries' average effective tax rates, though this effective
rate increase does not correspond to any specific policy. The model in this
paper employs explicitly marginal effective tax rates ——or,equivalently,
user costs of capital. It thus captures distortions in the allocation of
capital at the margin, and It allows calculation of excess burden associated
with raising revenue through higher statutory corporate tax rates, higher
capital gains taxes, slower depreciation allowances, lower Investment tax
credits, or increased personal taxes on interest or dividend income. For—3—
comparison, we also compute marginal excess burden for labor taxes and for
progressive personal income taxes.
For any given set of assumptions, differences among these tax instruments
are substantial. We find that the range of marginal excess burdens among the
various'capital tax instruments is larger than the difference found by BSH
between labor taxes and capital taxes. In fact, some changes in capital
taxation have negative marginal excess burden because they raise revenue while
reducing distortions.
All taxes on new investment income have the same distortionary effect on
the timing of consumption in our model. They all raise the price of saving
and postponing consumption until the future, as opposed to consuming in the
present. They therefore increase the intertemporal distortion caused by
taxes. However, capital taxes may differ in three other respects. First,
some tax instruments apply differentially to investments in different assets.
Depreciation allowances that differ from economic depreciation can distort the
choice among various types of equipment or structures, while the investment
tax credit distorts the allocation between equipment and other types of
capital. Raising taxes by reducing depreciation allowances or the investment
tax credit would therefore reduce tax—based Interasset distortions, ignored by
Judd (1987) and others discussed above. Our model includes Interasset
distortions among 38 individual asset categories.
Second, some tax Instruments apply differentially to different sectors of
the economy. Capital income in the unincorporated business sector is subject
to the personal Income tax, while equity—financed capital In the corporate—4-
sectorpaysan additional corporate tax and the imputed net rents in the
owner—occupied housing sector go tax—free. A policy of increasing the
statutory corporate tax rate, for example, would exacerbate these existing
intersectoral distortions, also ignored in studies discussed above.
Third and finally, tax instruments may differ in their impact on capital
that has already been put in place. For example, an increase in a statutory
rate collects lump—sum revenue from old capital, whereas cutbacks in
depreciation allowances or credits confer a lump—sum benefit to old capital
relative to new capital. Because it encompasses all of these economic
effects, our model is able to distinguish the excess burdens from using
different capital tax instruments to raise revenue.
This introduction is followed by sections about the model, results, and
conclusions.
II. The Model
Browning (1987) argues that marginal excess burden depends less on the
choice between partial and general equilibrium models and more on the choice
of specifications for the marginal effective tax rates, the degree of
progressivity, the labor supply elasticities, and the government's use of the
revenue. Once those dependencies are recognized, however, the results of a
partial equilibrium analysis can still be improved by imbedding those
specifications in a general equilibrium model. Moreover, Browning looked only
at taxes in one market, the labor market. The comparability of taxes on labor
and capital requires both markets in a single model, one which must therefore
be a general equilibrium model. In this case, to compare capital tax—5—
instruments with differential effects on distortions among assets or between
sectors, we employ a general equilibrium model where such choices are
endogenous.
The general equilibrium model in this paper consists of four major
components. First, the household side and part of production are taken from
the BSH model, as fully described in the book by Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven,
and Whalley (1985). Second, the model of marginal effective tax rates for
each asset in the corporate and noncorporate sectors is taken from Fullerton
and Henderson (1984). Third, detailed production functions allow endogenous
choices among assets and sectors, from Fullerton and Henderson (1986).
Finally, the model allows the tax treatment of old capital to differ from that
of new capital.
A.The Household Side
In our model, twelve income—differentiated households have initial
endowments of labor and capital that can be sold for use in production. As
indicated in the top part of figure 1, each household maximizes a nested
utility function by making an initial allocation of resources between present
and future consumption in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form.
The elasticity of substitution is set to be consistent with an exogenously
specified aggregate estimate for i,theuncompensated saving elasticity with
respect to the net rate of return.4
The total stock of capital is fixed in any one period, but it is fully
mobile among assets, sectors, and Industries. In evaluating alternative tax
policies, we simulate a sequence of equilibria in which the capital stock—6—
increases as a result of saving in the previous period. The currentrate of
return is the myopically expected future rate of return. Domestic savingis
the only vehicle by which investment can be affected, since themodel is not
open to international capitalflows.5
With present resources, as indicated in the next level of figure 1, a
household can choose to buy some of its own labor endowment for leisure.The
constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure isbased
on an exogenously specified aggregate estimate of ,theuncompensated labor
supply elasticity with respect to the net—of—taxwage.6 The twelve income
groups face tax rates that range from 1 percentto 40 percent of personal
marginal income. Present consumption expenditures are then divided among15
consumer goods according to a Cobb—Douglas subutility nest.Each consumer
good is a fixed—coefficient combination of outputs of the 18industries. The
model includes the entire spectrum of federal, state, and local taxes,
typically modeled as irin rates on appropriate products or factors.
B.Costs of CaDital and Marginal Effective Tax Rates
For capital costs in production, the BSW model uses average effective tax
rates based on observed tax payments by industry. As in Fullerton and
Henderson (1984), by contrast, we specify that each sector of each industry
faces a Hall—Jorgenson (1967) cost of capital for each asset type.
We model the perfectly competitive corporation contemplating a new
investment as follows.7 An investment tax credit at rate k reduces the net
cost of the asset to (1—k). The rental return increases at the constant
inflation rate ir and decreases because of exponential depreciation at rate—7—
&.Local property tax at rate w is paid on the asset's value at any point
in time, and the return net of property tax is subject to the corporate income
tax at statutory rate u. These net returns are discounted at the firm's
nominal after—tax discount rate r. The present value of depreciation
allowances per dollar of investment is z, so the present value of tax savings
is uz. In equilibrium, then, the net outlay must exactly match the present
value of net returns. This condition can be used to solve for C the
real social return in the corporate sector, gross of tax but net of
depreciation:
r—ir+6
(1) c 1—u(l—k—uz) +w— 6
All 38 assets in the corporate sector have the same values for r, ir, and u,
but each has a specific value for 6, k, z, and w. By replacing u and the
corporate discount rate by the noncorporate entrepreneur's personal marginal
tax rate and the corresponding discount rate, we derive a similar expression
for flC the pretax return in the noncorporate sector. Finally, owner—
occupied housing has an analogous expression that reflects its special tax
treatment.
To compute the rates of discount r in each sector, we assume that
individuals hold debt and equity issued by all three sectors, and that they
arbitrage away any differences in net rates of return. Under our arbitrage
assumption, all assets must provide the real net return that Individuals could
earn on their debt holdings. The resulting discount rate for each sector Is a
function of the shares and tax rates for the separate sources of finance ——
debt,retained earnings, and new share issues. We assume that the financial—8—
decision is exogenous.8 For further details, see the discussion of
individual arbitrage in the appendix to Fullerton and Henderson (1984).
Although investment ?ncentives are properly measured in themodel by the
pretax returns p, we present many of our results in termsof marginal
effective tax rates:
(2) tQI
where s is the return net of all taxes. These effective rates show the
portion of capital costs attributable to taxes. They reflectthe combination
and interaction of corporate taxes, property taxes, and personal taxes.
C.The Production Side
The first two stages of production are similar to the BSW model, as
indicated in figure 1. First, producers have fixed requirements of
intermediate inputs and value added per unit of output. Second, they can
substitute between labor and capital in the CES value—added function. At this
stage, however, we depart from the BSW model which constructs capitalcosts
from observed tax payments. As indicated in the bottom of figure 1, the
general equilibrium model is supplemented by two new stages of productionfrom
Fullerton and Henderson (1986). Once total capital expenditures are
determined for each industry, separate cost—of—capital expressions are used to
determine the division among the corporate, noncorporate business, and
owner—occupied housing sectors. Within each sector of each Industry,
Individual cost—of—capital calculations are used to determine demand for up to
38 different asset types. These assets include 20 types of equIpment, 15
types of structures, inventories, and land in each sector.—9—
The user costs for individual asset types depend on exogenous statutory
specifications and on the endogenous real after—tax rate of return, 5,
determined in equilibrium. Composite capital in the corporate sector of each
industry,K, is a CES co:bination of the 38 assets:9
C i C r Ct c—i
(3) K
I=i13(K1) j
Theelasticity of substitution among assets, c,isspecified exogenously.
The weights are derived from data on capital stocks by asset and
industry in 1984. Cost minimization of (3) based on individual asset costs




The noncorporate sector has similar composites of 38 assets in each industry.
The owner—occupied housing sector also has composite capital stocks and
capital costs, but it is assumed to use only two assets (residential
structures and land).
Capital In each industry is another CES function of and KC,
the composite capital stocks from each sector. (The real estate industry uses
a composite of KC and K, the composite capital from owner—occupied
housing.) The elasticity of substitution between corporate and noncorporate
capital, a, is also prespecified.1° Finally, for each industry, cost
minimization based on sectoral composite costs of capital (in equation 4)
yields a demand for composite capital in each sector, and it yields a
composite cost of capital for the industry.—10--
Each industry has a different mix of assets in each sector, as well as a
different mix of sectors, all determined endogenously. Different tax
treatments imply that each use of capital has its own pre—tax rate of return,
or marginal product, even though they all generate the same after—tax rate of
return. Capital Is homogeneous and perfectly mobile, so this net rate of
return adjusts. Hhen the total use of capital equals the total available
supply, we have equilibrium in the capital market; when other markets clear as
well, we have a general equilibrium.
This extension of the production side of the model is important because
the choices of c arid a, as well as ofand ,havemuch bearing on
the relative size of different distortions and therefore on the relative
attractiveness of alternative sources of revenue. If c is high, for
example, then changes In the relative tax treatment of different assets would
result in a more significant change in the firm's production. A high value
forwould therefore imply re1atively low marginal excess burden from
revenue acquired by reducing depreciation allowances or the Investment tax
credit, since these tax instruments have a differential effect on assets in
the baseline. If a is high, then the sectoral allocation of capital would
be quite sensitive to changes in the relative tax treatment of corporations
and noncorporate entities, such as through changes in the statutory corporate
tax rate. The choice of r, the savings elasticity, matters for aggregate
capital accumulation. Ifis high, then increased taxation of the return
to capital income would result in a higher saving response, and therefore a
higher marginal excess burden, than in the case whereIs low. Finally,
the value ofaffects primarily labor supply. Together, the pre—specified
values foranddetermine the relative marginal excess burdens for
capital taxes and labor taxes.—11—
D.ThePossibility of Lump—Sum Revenue
khen minimizing excess burden subject to a revenue requirement, analysts
typically assume that lump—sum taxes are not available. This is often a
reasonable assumption. Government cannot continue to acquire nondistorting
revenue by surprising taxpayers period after period. In the steady state,
then, we expect the marginal effective tax rate on capital income to equal the
average effective tax rate (the ratio of total taxes collected to total income
from capital). Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) estimate only average
effective tax rates and use those for marginal investment, but In Fullerton
and Henderson (1986), we estimate marginal effective tax rates and use those
to Indicate capital tax revenues in the steady state.
Lump—sum revenue effects might be associated with tax changes, however,
especially those of the type we consider in this paper. A new higher
corporate rate, for example, applies to income from existing assets and can
generate more tax than the investors expected when they first put those assets
in place. Indeed, tax changes can generate all kinds of windfall
redistributions among households and government, as discussed by Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1983), Summers (1985), and Goulder and Summers (1987). These
amounts are particularly important for the calculation of marginal excess
burden, because they affect revenue change In the denominator but not excess
burden In the numerator. They thus necessitate another new feature of our
model.
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If marginal revenue is acquired through a reduction of Investment tax
credits, then the Increase in the marginal effective tax rate applied to
capital In each use would overstate the amount of revenue actually—12—
forthcoming. Our model first calculates revenue based on the new higher
marginal effective tax rate, but it then calculates for owners of old capital
the lump—sum subsidy they receive from government by not having to pay the new
higher marginal effective tax rate. They actually receive this subsidy in the
form of asset price appreciation, since investors receive a lower investment
tax credit for new assets and are therefore willing to pay a little more for
old assets of the same type. To calculate this subsidy, our model converts
the one—time investment tax credit to an equivalent annual fraction of
remaining capital each year, calculates this annualized investment tax credit
for each asset both before and after the change, and then obtains the annual
lump—sum subsidy as the difference between these rates applied to the original
capital of each asset type as it depreciates over time. The present value of
this stream is the windfall received by owners at the time of the change.
Depreciation changes are modeled in analogous fashion. We convert the
actual sequence of deductions into the present—value—equivalent annual
fraction of remaining capital, take the tax effect of the change in this
annualized deduction as the annual lump—sum change in revenues (and in capital
incomes), and apply this rate to old capital as it depreciates over time. If
the marginal dollar of revenue is obtained by lengthening lives or reducing
declining, balance rates, then the owners of old capital receive this windfall,
a subsidy relative to the higher marginal effective tax rate on new investment.
For an Increase in corporate or noncorporate statutory rates, the
marginal effective tax rate calculation Incorrectly Indicates revenue for
depreciable assets. Since depreciation allowances enter the marginal
effective tax rate only through uz in equation (1), those revenue calculations—13—
WOuldbe correctfor any asset that received a deduction for a constant
fraction of real income each year. For example, this would be true for
deductions based on economic depreciation at replacement cost. The problem
arises because actual allowances follow a different time pattern. Even If
they have the same present value as economic depreciation at replacement cost,
actual allowances tend to be accelerated (frontloaded) rather than Indexed
(backloaded). Thus, relative to the revenue implied by the marginal effective
tax rate, assets already received more of their deductions at the previous
lower rate and will receive fewer of their deductions at the new higher rate.
For these assets, the rate increase thus acquires more revenue than implied by
marginal rates. Therefore, we adjust revenues upward for old capital In each
year following the rate change. The extra revenue is the change in the
statutory rate applied to the difference between actual deductions and those
implied by the marginal rate calculation. Actual deductions in each year are
estimated from a constructed history of investment and the time pattern of
deductions specified by the tax code.13
Finally, an increase in the personal taxation of dividends also can
generate lump—sum tax. The shares were issued and the investments were put in
place under the expectation of one rate of tax on future distributions, so a
new permanently higher rate might be capitalized Into the value of the
shares, Stockholders experience a windfall loss equal to the present value of
the increase in future tax payments. We calculate this lump sum tax by
equivalent annual amounts equal to the dividend payments on depreciating old
capital times the increase In rate. There is no lump—sum tax adjustment
associated with changes in the personal taxation of Interest or capital gains
in this model.14—14—
L. Data and Calibration
Using national income and product accounts from the Commerce Department,
we update to 1984 the general equilibrium data set for 1973 used by BSW. For
marginal effective capita tax rates, we also use 1984 values for statutory
rates, credits, and depreciation allowances as summarized in Fullerton (1987).
Once the crucial elasticity parameters are specified exogenously, the
benchmark data set can be used in demand and production functions to solve for
other weighting parameters. This calibration ensures that the baseline 1984
data set represents an equilibrium solution to the model using those weighting
parameters, elasticities, and 1984 tax rates. Labor force growth also is
specified so that the baseline 1984 data set lies on a steady state growth
path.
Alternative equilibrium sequences are then generated by slight variations
in any 1984 tax or credit rate. At each trial price vector, the model
calculates new capital costs and allocations, new labor supplies and demands,
and new production and consumption vectors. After an equilibrium is found,
all prices and quantities are compared to the baseline by calculating the
present value of equivalent variations. Finally, the aggregate welfare change
is compared to the corresponding present value revenue change to calculate the
excess burden per marginal dollar of revenue.
F.Simulation and Sensitivity
Following BSW, we calculate marginal excess burdens by simulating a
one—percent increase in tax rates. Each capital tax instrument, for example,
is changed by enough to raise the overall marginal effective tax rate on—15—
'capital by one percent. In each experiment, 6 equilibria are calculated 10
years apart, so our total simulation interval is 50 years. For comparability
with BSH, all our simulations assume that transfers to households are fixed in
real terms while marginal revenues are used by government for proportional
increases in other expenditures. Implicitly, therefore, public goods enter
utility in a separable manner.15
The "standard" set of parameters includes c =1and a =1,the
Cobb—Douglas case for assets and sectors in production. He also use r =
0.4,the savings elasticity estimate of Boskin (1978) used by BSH. Finally,
—.15is the central value for the uncompensated labor supply elasticity
used by BSH. Our strategy in constructing alternatives is to pick
combinations that point out the likely range of welfare effects from
alternative policies. He consider values of c and a between 0.3 and 3,
values ofbetween 0 and 0.8, and values ofbetween 0 and 0.3. As we
stressed in our earlier literature review (Fullerton and Henderson, 1986),
existing econometric work on subsitution elasticities does not consider the
number of assets we include in this model. Neither does it attempt
specifically to measure a sectoral substitution elasticity. There remains
considerable uncertainty about these parameter values.
III. Results
A. Effective Tax Rates in the Baseline
Before reporting simulation results, It Is worth noting levels and
differences in effective tax rates in the 1984 baseline. As indicated in
table 1, the average marginal effective tax rate on capital income is 33.6
percent, with a standard deviation of 7.6 percentage points. The overall rate—16—
in the corporate sector is only 37 percent, despite the combination of
corporate and personal taxes, because of the combined effect of credits,
allowances, and interest deductions. This rate is only slightly higher than
the 35 percent overall rate in the noncorporate sector, because the
noncorporate sector uses a higher proportion of highly taxed assets such as
land and inventories. Also, the corporate sector receives a subsidy when it
uses debt finance, since interest payments are deducted by corporations at a
higher rate than they are included in the taxable income of Individuals.
Owner—occupied housing has a 23 percent effective rate, largely comprised of
local property taxes.
Within the corporate sector, effective rates for equipment are near zero,
ranging from —4 percent (for office and computing machinery) to +3 percent
(for railroad equipment). Effective taxation of structures is much higher,
since these do not qualify for the investment tax credit and since
depreciation allowances are less generous. These rates lie between 32 and 48
percent. Tax rates for public utility property are generally somewhat lower
than those for other structures) since they do receive an investment tax
credit. Finally, tax rates for inventories and land are above 48 percent.
These assets do not receive special tax incentives (other than the subsidy to
corporate debt, which is common to all assets). The noncorporate business
sector exhibits similar interasset variations. For further details, see
Fullerton and Henderson (1986).
By contrast, the averages for other taxes we consider in our simulations
are lower (see table 1). Labor taxes levied on Industry Include contributions
for social insurance, workmen's compensation, and railroad retirement.—17—
FoHowing BSV, we treat these as pure taxes rather than netting out the
transfer payments associated with these tax contributions. The average rate
for these labor taxes is 12.7 percent, with a standard deviation of 1.2
points. Our twelve household groups face marginal personal income tax rates
as high as 40 percent. The income—weighted average of these rates is 25.5
percent, with a comparatively high standard deviation of 9.8 points.
He could also examine the other taxes studied by BSW. We choose not to
do so, because our model does not introduce innovations for output or sales
taxes, and because the inclusion of labor and personal income tax rates in our
experiments appears to provide enough basis for comparison of results.16
B. General Equilibrium Simulations
Table 2 presents marginal excess burdens from raising revenues in
different ways, using our standard set of assumptions on elasticities. The
first column shows results based on revenue given only by marginal effective
tax rates, with no adjustment for lump—sum taxes. These may be relevant for
steady state comparisons, but not for actual revenue acquired through each of
these tax instruments. The second column shows results with lump—sum revenue
adjustments, and we will refer primarily to these calculations. We compute
for comparison the marginal excess burdens from raising industry tax rates on
labor, and from raising personal income tax rates. These marginal excess
burdens are 18 and 26 cents, respectively, slightly below the standard
estimates of BSH. Progressive personal taxes reach higher rates and are
therefore more distorting than proportional labor taxes.—18—
For capital taxes, the overall impression is that the marginal excess
burden differs considerably across specific tax instruments. The marginal
excess burden may be either higher or lower than that resulting from changes
in labor or personal income taxes; it may even be less thanzero.'7 He find
that increasing the corporate statutory rate has a relatively high excess
burden but policies of reducing allowances for capital cost recovery have
negative marginal excess burdens. None of these capital taxes in our model
has a marginal excess burden as high as the 46—cent figure found by BSH for
capital taxation in general. This is not surprising, in that our marginal
effective tax rates are lower and less variable than their average effective
tax rates.
From an efficiency standpoint, the most favorable policy is reduction of
the investment tax credit; under the standard parameters the marginal excess
burden is a negative 37 cents. This result contrasts sharply with that of
Judd (1987). He found the highest marginal excess burden from reducing the
investment tax credit, but his infinite—life model emphasizes intertemporal
effects and excludes interasset effects.
Our negative marginal excess burden arises because the values for
effective tax rates on equipment are the lowest in our baseline: they average
about zero for the corporate sector, and are actually below zero (that is,
effectively subsidies) in the noncorporate business sector. The rates for
public utilities, which also receive the investment tax credit, are low
compared to most other taxes on capital. Thus the efficiency gain from
lowering the dispersion in effective tax rates in this manner more than
offsets the loss on the intertemporal margin. It should be noted that these—19—
results also capture the inefficiency of providing a lump—sum subsidy to old
capital. This subsidy alters the marginal excess burden only slightly,
however, compared to column 1. Equipment depreciates comparatively rapidly,
so the amount of old equipment is significant only in the first equilibrium
period.
18
The next simulations present two alternative methods of tightening up on
depreciation allowances: multiplicative scaling of tax lifetimes and
multiplicative scaling of declining balance rates for the various assets.19
These two ways of raising capital tax revenue have comparatively low marginal
excess burdens because they increase the taxes paid on depreciable assets
relative to the more heavily—taxed nondepreciable assets. Of the two methods,
the equiproportional increase in tax lifetimes is more advantageous from the
standpoint of efficiency because it causes a comparatively greater increase in
the effective taxation of equipment, the lowest taxed asset.
The remaining simulations for capital taxation consider increases in
statutory rates. Raising the corporate tax rate results in a relatively high
marginal excess burden of 33 cents because it widens the disparity between the
effective taxation of the corporate sector and the unincorporated sectors, as
well as increasing the distortions on the intertemporal and lnterasset
margins. The reason for the increase in disparity in taxation across assets
Is that the rise in the statutory rate increases the value of depreciation
deductions, thereby conferring a relative benefit to the already low—taxed
depreciable assets.—20—
Ifweraise the statutory rate for owners of noncorporate businesses as
well as for corporations, then the marginal excess burden is reduced to 27
cents because of the less unfavorable effect on intersectoral distortions.
Still, this change increases the distortion between business capital and
housing, relative to our baseline. Also, because we scale up statutory rates
in both sectors by the same multiplicative constant, and because the statutory
rate in the corporate sector is higher than in the noncorporate sector, the
simulation is still not neutral in its comparative effect on these two
business sectors.
Ne also examine the impacts of changing personal tax rates on capital
gains, dividends, and interest income. Since the source of finance is
exogenous in our model, we do not capture efficiency effects on the choice
among financial instruments. Also, we model the capital gains tax as an
accrual tax, so we do not capture distortions in decisions to realize gains.
Instead, these changes primarily affect the intersectoral and intertemporal
margins. The marginal excess burden for the capital gains rate is 22 cents.
Like the change in the statutory corporate rate, it raises the effective rate
in the corporate sector still further above the effective rates for
unincorporated businesses and housing. The efficiency cost is less than that
associated with raising the corporate statutory rate, however, because the
capital gains tax has more neutral effects on interasset distortions. As
noted above, an increase in the statutory corporate rate raises the value of
depreciation deductions and therefore lowers the relative increase in the tax
on depreciable assets (which are Initially taxed at low rates) compared to
nondepreciable assets (which are initially taxed at higher rates). By
contrast, the change in the capital gains rate does not introduce this new
interasset distorton.—21—
As can be seen from column 1 of table 2, the taxation of dividends enters
the model in a way similar to the taxation of capital gains. The difference
in the calculated excess burdens in column 2 is entirely explained by
differential lump—sum effects. Because we model capital gains taxation as an
accrual tax, its increase does not affect the entire amount of unrealized
gains. Although we were motivated to choose this modeling specification
largely for reasons of simplicity, we note that legislation introducing higher
tax rates on capital gains typically delays implementation in order to allow
investors to realize their existing gains at the previous rate. An increase
in the tax rate on dividend income, by contrast, has a large lump—sum
component because it affects the full amount of equity that investors have
amassed in corporations. This lump—sum element adds to the revenue collected
without introducing economic distortions. Therefore we measure that the
marginal excess burden from another dollar of dividend taxes is only 4 cents.
The marginal excess burden for interest income also is low. This change
increases tax payments of those who hold debt in all three sectors, so we
would expect it to be more neutral in its intersectoral effects than increased
taxes on dividends or capital gains. In our model, this change in tax policy
actually reduces intersectoral distortions because of the arbitrage assumption
described in section IIB. Raising the tax rate on interest Income raises the
interest rate needed for a given after—tax rate of return. This Increased
interest rate is relatively advantageous to the corporate sector because
interest is deducted at a statutory rate that exceeds those in the other two
sectors. Therefore, the gap between the effective rate for corporate capital
and other types of capital is actually reduced In this simulation.—22—
C. Sensitivity Analysis
One set of sensitivity experiments involves varying factor supply
elasticities. Table 3 displays some representative results. As expected,
increases in the labor supply elasticity raise the marginal excess burden from
the labor tax and personal income tax experiments, while increases in the saving
elasticity raise the marginal excess burden from the corporate tax and personal
income tax experiments. However, the permutations of labor supply elasticities
between 0 and 0.3 and of saving elasticities between 0 and 0.8 do not change
the relative rankings of our tax instruments. Under all cases, increases in
the statutory corporate income tax rate are always the most distorting,
decreases in the investment tax credit are the least distorting, and increases
in personal income tax rates and labor tax rates are always In between.
Figure 2 summarizes the results for variations between 0.3 and 3.0 for
the asset substitution elasticity, c, and the sector substitution
elasticity, a. (The appendix shows the underlying numerical findings in
detail.) A low value for c raises the marginal excess burden from reducing
the rate of investment tax credit or depreciation allowances, but it generally
themarginal excess burden of raising statutory rates. A low value for
a tends to reduce the marginal excess burden for most of our simulated
changes in capital tax instruments. Under extreme assumptions for these
elasticity parameters, a deceleration of depreciation allowances through a
reduction in declining balance rates may have a marginal excess burden higher
than that for personal income taxes. Under different extreme assumptions, an
increase in the statutory corporate rate may have a marginal excess burden
lower than that for personal income taxes. The change in burden associated
with reducing the investment tax credit or lengthening tax lives continues to
compare favorably with those for other revenue sources. The highest estimated—23—
marginal excess burden is 75 cents, from increasing the corporate rate when
bothc andequal 3.
IV.Conclusion
Our paper has demonstrated a large variation in marginal excess burdens
from capital tax instruments. Under our central assumptions for elasticity
parameters, and using the 1984 U.S. tax structure as a base, an extra dollar
of public spending financed by higher statutory corporate income tax rates
would have to produce marginal benefits of at least $1.33 in order to improve
social welfare. By contrast, the required marginal benefit for a project
financed by reduced investment tax credits would be only 63 cents. These
values bound the results for other capital tax instruments, labor tax rates,
and personal income tax rates.
It may be argued that a more fully developed model would find similar
variation in marginal excess burdens for other tax instruments. In the area
of personal income taxation, for example, we might expect that the marginal
excess burden from lowering the standard deduction to be different from the
marginal excess burden from restricting the deductibility of charitable
giving. However, existing simulations of changes in the marginal rate of tax
on personal income at least involve a parameter that can be altered by
legislation in a well—defined way. By contrast, the marginal effective tax
rate on income from capital is inherently an amalgam of separate tax
Instruments. Our study has measured the marginal excess burdens from each of
these Instruments, taking Into account their individual effects on decisions
about asset use and sectoral concentration, as well as effects on old capital
relative to new capital.Footnotes
1
Taxes can distort labor supply, saving, housing, financing, risk—bearing,
trade, and other economic decisions. The voluminous excess burden literature
is reviewed in chapters of Auerbach and Feldstein, editors, Handbook of Public
Economics (1985).
2
See, for example, Browning (1976, 1987), Usher (1982), Stuart (1984),
Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985), Hansson and Stuart (1985, 1986), and Judd
(1987).
See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972), Atkinson and Stern (1974), and King
(1986).
We do not keep the savings elasticity (n) fixed across policy
simulations. Rather, we use econometric estimates of r only to suggest a
reasonable value for the elasticity of substitution between present and future
consumption. This structural parameter of the utility function does not vary
across policies, so the model is not subject to the Lucas (1976) critique. We
examine alternative savings elasticities only to suggest reasonable
alternative starting points for the structural parameter.
These assumptions affect the results. Ballard and Goulder (1985) show how
results depend on static expectations compared to perfect foresight. Summers
(1981) shows how results can change with wealth effects and multiperiod
planning in a life—cycle model. Judd (1987) uses perfect foresight with
infinitely lived consumers. Also, Goulder, Shoven and Whalley (1983) show how
international capital flows can alter or even reverse the relative ranking of
different tax reforms.
6As before, the specified value for the labor supply elasticity is used to
find an appropriate value for the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure. This structural parameter then remains fixed across
policy simulations.ke assumethat the firm makes this investment under conditions of
certainty, and that it has sufficient tax liability to take associated credits
and deductions. The effects of uncertainty and imperfect loss offsets are
investigated in Auerbach (1986) and Auerbach and Poterba (1987). We also
assume that the firm does not resell the asset. The incentive to churn assets
is studied in Gordon, Hines, and Summers (1987).
8
Marginal excess burden results could be different if highly—taxed assets
systematically use more tax—favored debt. Also, our model considers
distortions in the allocation of real assets only. With endogenous financial
decisions, corporate rate increases would reinforce the tax advantages of debt
over equity and thus exacerbate financial distortions.
Actually, this is an allocation over the assets that the firm uses in the
baseline data. Firms cannot substitute into assets that were not used in the
baseline (where initial =0).Also, land is one of the 38 assets in
equation (3). Any given industry might use more or less land in a new
equilibrium, even if land were in fixed total supply. Moreover, the total use
of land in the three productive sectors of this model may Increase at the
expense of vacant or unused land. Finally, we include inventories In equation
(3), because some capital must be allocated to stocks of inputs and/or stocks
of output in order to provide the final product or service.
10
Little is known about the incorporation decision of firms. The CES
functional form is intended only as a representation of capital allocation,
and of the possibility .that it is responsive to tax differentials.
Furthermore, we treat labor as homogeneous in the sense that It can be
combined either with corporate or noncorporate capital in each Industry. An
alternative structure might combine labor and capital In each sector to make
separate corporate and noncorporate outputs.
Imperfect mobility and adjustment costs are investigated, for example, In
Goulder and Summers (1987).12Agents in our model are surprised by any tax change but then expect the
new tax regime to remain in place forever. Tax changes could generate
additional distortions through time consistency problems, however, if they
were to increase subjectively held probabilities of subsequent tax changes.
13We Ignore the fact that some capital existing in 1984 was being
depreciated under rules specified by earlier law.
14For the tax on interest income, the absence of a lump—sum effect means
that all debt is short term. For the capital gains tax, it means that all
pre—existing gains are realized before the higher rate takes effect.
15Marginal excess burden results could be higher or lower, respectively, if
the marginal revenue were used to provide public goods that were complementary
to leisure or to labor.
16We also choose not to repeat the BSW experiment of raising all tax rates
simultaneously. In our model there is no single way to raise capital taxes by
the same proportion as labor taxes. Moreover, in neither model is there a
single way to define marginal excess burden for the whole tax system. Any
combination of changes corresponds to a particular set of weights for the
different tax instruments. For example, raising all rates proportionately is
different from raising all sources of revenue proportionately.
17The interpretation of marginal excess burden can be difficult. Higher
tax rates generally increase the marginal excess burden ratio up to the peak
of the Laffer curve, where the increment to revenue becomes zero in the
denominator. Beyond that point, marginal excess burden is negative because
the increment to revenue is negative. In this paper, increments to revenue
are always positive, and marginal excess burden Is negative only when excess
burden falls in the numerator. In all cases, however, efficiency Is improved
the most by using the tax instrument with the largest negative ratio of
marginal excess burden. In the Laffer case, this means acquiring revenue by
reducing the tax rate.Comparing columns 1 and 2 of Table 2, we see that the lump—sum adjustment
increases the absolute value of the negative marginal excess burden associated
with the investment tax credit, but only because (a) the lump—sum subsidy to
owners of old capital implies a loss of revenue, and (b) the distorting
investment tax credit must be reduced further to get back the same dollar of
revenue.
19
The law in 1984 allowed 150 percent of the straight line rate for
equipment and 175 percent of the straight line rate for structures, where
these rates apply to a basis that declines as allowances are taken.
Legislators typically consider lowering declining balance rates or increasing
lifetimes when they consider raising revenues through a change in depreciation
allowances, since these parameters are familiar to them. As the simulation
results indicate, however, the effects of changing declining balance
percentages may be quite different from the effects of changing lifetimes.References
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Characteristics of Tax Rates in the Model
Weighted Mean Weighted
of Marginal Standard Coefficient
Tax Ratesa Deviation of Variation
Capital Taxes .336 .076 .227
Labor Taxes .127 .012 .092
Personal Income Taxes .255 .098 .386
alax rates are expressed as a fraction of the appropriate category of gross
income.Table 2
Marginal Excess Burdens of Raising Extra Revenue from
Specific Portions of the Tax System
(Standard Elasticities: =.l5, n=.4, c=l, a=1)
Without Adjustment With Adjustment
for Lump—Sum Taxes for Lump—Sum Taxes
I.Capital Tax Instrumets
A. Investment Tax Credit —.343 —.366
B. Depreciation Allowances
1.Lifetimes —.161 —.178
2. Declining Balance Rates .068 .091
C. Corporate Income Tax Rate .402 .332
D. Corporate and Noncorporate
Income Tax Rates .344 .271
E. Personal Income Tax Rates
1. Capital Gains .217 .217
2. Dividends .217 .044
3. Interest Income .037 .037
II. Labor Tax Rates at Industry Level .175 .175
III. Personal Income Tax Rates .256 .256
Note: Ballard, Shover,, and Whalley (1985) obtained the following marginal
excess burdens for =.15 and =.4:CapitalTax Rates at Industry Level,
.463; Labor Tax Rates at Industry Level, .230; and Personal Increase Tax
Rates, .314.Table 3
Sensitivity of Marginal Excess Burdens to Factor Supply Elasticities
aStandard value n=.4 for saving elasticity.







I. Capital Tax Instruments
A. Investment Tax Credit —.369 —.363 —.397—.329
B. Corporate Income Tax Rate .280 .383 .239 .433
II. Labor Tax Rates at Industry Level .069 .294 .170 .179
III.Personal Income Tax Rates .146 .379 .224 .287Utility U is a CES function of present
consumption H and future consumption CF.
Present consumption H is a CES function
leisure L and a composite good X.
X is a Cobb-Douglas composite of the 15
consumer goods Xm
Each consumer good Xm (e.g., appliances) is a
fixed coefficient mix of the 19 producer goods
Q (e.g., metals, transportation,and trade).
Each producer good Q uses fixed proportions
of value added VA1 and intermediate inputs A.
Intermediate inputs are the 19 producer
goods, in fixed proportions for each industry.
Value added VA1 is a CES function of
labor L1 and capital K.
Capital K1 in each industry is a CES function J
of corporate capital KC and noncorporate
capital Kc.
jJ In the housing industry, capital is a CES function of
owner-occupied housing and noncorporate rental housing.
Use of capital in each sector is a CES
function of the 38 asset types.
Figure 1
A Diagrammatic Summary of the Model
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